Emory International Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 3

2019

Rushing to Regulate: Rethinking the RBI's Directives on Peer-toPeer Regulations in India
Namratha Minupuri

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr

Recommended Citation
Namratha Minupuri, Rushing to Regulate: Rethinking the RBI's Directives on Peer-to-Peer Regulations in
India, 33 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 433 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss3/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

MINUPURICOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19

5/23/2019 10:25 AM

RUSHING TO REGULATE: RETHINKING THE RBI’S
DIRECTIVES ON PEER-TO-PEER REGULATIONS IN INDIA
ABSTRACT
Almost half of India still does not have a bank account, leaving millions of
Indians unable to access traditional sources of credit. For these unbanked
Indians, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms have become an important
alternative credit source. A recent boom in P2P platforms caused the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) to create a regulatory framework for the P2P sector. This
Comment seeks to address some of the issues concerning regulating an
unconventional industry that provides a crucial service. First, it is argued that
the RBI fundamentally mischaracterizes both the services P2P’s provide, and
how P2P’s provide these services. The Comment then discusses challenges P2P
regulation poses for the RBI, arguing that the RBI’s framework both over- and
underregulates P2P platforms. Finally, this Comment recommends India adopt
U.S. P2P regulations, allowing for an exemption-based approach to lending.
Given that alternative credit is much needed in India, this comment hopes to
better tailor current regulations, in order to avoid a total regulatory overhaul.
INTRODUCTION
Following the 2008 financial crisis, banks scaled back lending, which meant
small businesses and individuals were cut off from traditional sources of credit.1
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) platforms filled this lending vacuum by providing alternate
sources of financing.2 Potential lenders match with borrowers through an online
marketplace, allowing them to bypass traditional financial services middlemen.3
While P2P lending started out as a relatively simple system for facilitating loans
between individuals online, it has since grown into a complex system of
technologies, institutions, and startups.4
In India, the P2P sector is new, with only thirty P2P platforms registered as
of 2016.5 However, India is a credit-strapped country, and, following

1
Special Report, From the People, for the People, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015) https://www.
economist.com/news/special-report/21650289-will-financial-democracy-work-downturn-people-people.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.; see also Sven C. Berger & Fabian Gleisner, Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic
Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending, 2 BUS. RES. J. 39, 39 (May 2009).
5
RES. BANK OF INDIA, CONSULTATION PAPER ON PEER TO PEER LENDING 7 (Apr. 2016),
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/pdfs/CPERR280416.pdf.
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demonetization, it is also cash-strapped.6 Of the sixty million small businesses
in India, only thirty-three percent are able to access institutional credit.7
Individuals, 80% of whom self-finance, face similar credit barriers, with 32%
relying on friends or family, and another 12% raising funds from informal
banking networks.8 Many of these potential borrowers are traditionally
unbanked, have limited credit histories, and do not know how to navigate
traditional banking institutions.9 Moreover, 40% of Indians still do not have a
bank account.10 P2P lenders have taken note of these potential borrowers, and
thirty lending platforms have collectively disbursed loans totaling $25 million
USD.11
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) recognized the potential for Indian P2P
growth when it noted that “this industry has the potential to disrupt the financial
sector and throw surprise. A sound regulatory framework will prevent such
surprises.”12 On October 4, 2017, the RBI issued a Master Direction bringing
P2Ps under the RBI’s regulatory jurisdiction by classifying P2Ps as NonBanking Financial Companies (NBFC-P2Ps) under Section 451 of the RBI Act
in an effort to stabilize the P2P sector.13 While many welcomed the structure
6
Manas Chakravarty, How Demonetisation Crippled Bank Lending, LIVEMINT (June 6, 2017),
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/j6FWY6uYX5sGxcqW4WR1dN/How-demonetisation-crippled-banklending.html (“Indeed, in the second half of FY2017, bank lending to rural Haryana, Punjab, Goa, Maharashtra
and Kerala contracted. Lending to rural Maharashtra fell by as much as 9.2%. Putting that in perspective, bank
loans in the second half of FY16 to rural Haryana increased by 18% and to rural Punjab by 12.2%, while rural
Maharashtra saw an increase in lending of 5.8%. Not a single state had showed a contraction in rural lending in
the second half of FY16. In other words, the slowdown in rural lending in the second half of FY17 was very
abnormal and may be attributed largely to demonetisation.”). Demonetization refers to the Indian government’s
decision on November 8, 2016 to remove all 500 and 1000 rupee banknotes from circulation. The High Economic
Costs of India’s Demonetisation, Economist (Jan. 7, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-andeconomics/2017/01/07/the-high-economic-costs-of-indias-demonetisation. By removing eighty-six percent of
cash in circulation the government hoped to curb the use of “black money.” Id. However, the move has been
widely criticized for causing massive cash shortages that disproportionally impacted middle to low income
Indians. Id.
7
Allen Taylor, Review of India Regulation on P2P Lending Market, LENDING TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://lending-times.com/2017/09/18/review-of-indian-regulation-on-p2p-market/
8
Id.
9
Chethan Kumari, 40 Percent of India is Unbanked & Hurting the Most; Exchange of Currency
Permitted Only Once Till RBI Review, TIMES OF INDIA (Nov. 12, 2016), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
business/india-business/40-of-India-is-unbanked-hurting-the-most-Exchange-Of-Currency-Permitted-OnlyOnce-Till-RBI-Review/articleshow/55392031.cms.
10
Id.
11
Tarush Bhalla, Fintech Startups Join Hands to Form India’s First P2P Lending Association,
YOURSTORY (Jan. 10, 2018), https://yourstory.com/2018/01/fintech-startups-join-hands-form-indias-firstp2p-lending-association (“India has around 30 online P2P lending platforms with a loan book of approximately
$25 million.”).
12
CONSULTATION PAPER ON PEER TO PEER LENDING, supra note 5, at 9.
13
Master Directions - Non-Banking Financial Company – Peer to Peer Lending Platform (Reserve Bank)
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these regulations provided, others are wary of the prudential and governance
requirements NBFC-P2Ps now have to meet.14
This Comment argues that in trying to structure the P2P sector, the RBI has
substantially overregulated the industry by misunderstanding the innovative
contributions of P2Ps. By misclassifying P2Ps as NBFCs, the RBI imposed
inappropriate prudential and governance regulations. This Comment focuses on
the most common form of P2P lending: unsecured consumer loans brokered
between strangers through an online platform. Section II explains how P2Ps
currently function in India, how P2Ps are uniquely suited to extending credit to
Indian consumers, and why the industry must be encouraged. Extending credit
to the traditionally unbanked is key for developing Indian financial markets.
Section III documents the problems P2P lending poses for Indian regulators
and examines why RBI regulations do not adequately address the problems
presented. Part IV concludes by recommending that India should adopt a U.S.style exemption approach to P2P regulation. The U.S. approach allows the RBI
to avoid a total regulatory overhaul and instead focus on tailoring P2P
regulations.
Many P2P regulators welcome RBI regulation.15 This Comment does not
argue that the Indian P2P sector should remain unregulated, but rather considers
whether the RBI regulations sufficiently address the regulatory challenges P2Ps
pose. By building on scholarship analyzing global P2P regulation, this Comment
hopes to offer a model of Indian P2P regulation that allows for increased and
more equitable financial access.

Directions, Res. Bank of India (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=
11137&Mode=0, [hereinafter Master Directions]
14
Shivasnkari Bhuvaneswaran, What Do Prominent P2P Players Think of the RBI Regulations?,
FINEXTRA: BLOGS (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/14376/what-do-prominent-p2pplayers-think-of-the-rbi-regulations; Pratik Bhakta, Rs. 10 Lakh Limit on P2P Lending Will Hurt Industry: P2P
Startup Founders, ETTECH: STARTUPS (Oct. 7, 2017), https://tech.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/startups/
rs-10-lakh-limit-on-p2p-lending-will-hurt-industry-p2p-startup-founders/60980922 (“‘The Rs. 10-lakh limit for
both borrowers and lenders is a major detriment to the sector as a whole, it is too low and should be revised
upwards,’ said Sanjay Darbha, founder of Peerlend, a Hyderabad-based P2P startup. ‘Such low limits will push
people to cash borrowings from expensive money lenders and defeat the entire purpose around P2P lending.’
Echoing similar fears, Shankar Vaddadi, founder of another P2P startup iLend, said high net-worth individuals
with higher disposable corpus would be discouraged from participating in this sector in the wake of such
limitations.”).
15
Bhuvaneswaran, supra note 14.
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INDIAN P2PS AND THE DREAM OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION

Of the estimated 260 million Indians (or 26% of the population) who live in
poverty, approximately 193 million (or 74%) live in rural areas.16 The majority
of these rural poor Indians have no access to formal credit sources.17 As a result,
they are forced to rely on informal finance, mainly from moneylenders, who are
free to charge exorbitant interest rates.18 There is also the issue of bias—fiftyeight percent of surveyed Indians reported that it is difficult for them to get
access to credit because of their gender, ethnicity, or religion.19 These
populations are further disadvantaged when their lack of credit access prevents
them from building credit histories for future loans.20
Access to credit is similarly out-of-reach for most small Indian businesses.
Close to eighty percent of small businesses have no links with formal financial
institutions.21 A study by the Nachiket Mor Committee noted that on the demand
side, small businesses have “limited managerial capabilities and financial
management skills, lack appropriate documents, and require small ticket size
loans.”22 The study further notes that on the supply side “banks lack credit
information about the clients, classify small businesses loans as risky, and see
financing to small enterprises as a low revenue activity.”23
P2P platforms address, to varying degrees, all of these credit-access
bottlenecks in India. First, P2Ps have no physical location and all transactions

16

PRIYA BASU, IMPROVING ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR INDIA’S RURAL POOR xxvii (2006).
Id. at xvi.
18
Id.
19
Press Trust of India, Religious, Gender Bias Greater in India for Jobs, Credit: Study, BUS. STANDARD,
(May 11, 2015), http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/religious-gender-bias-greater-in-indiafor-jobs-credit-study-115051100075_1.html.
20
BASU, supra note 16, at xvi.
21
Charan Singh and Kishinchand Poornima Wasdani, Finance for Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized
Enterprises in India: Sources and Challenges (ADBI, Working Paper 581, 2016), https://www.adb.org/sites/
default/files/publication/188868/adbi-wp581.pdf (“According to International Finance Corporation (2012), the
supply of finance to the MSME sector is estimated to be 32.5 trillion Indian rupees (Rs). This total comprises
contributions from informal finance, formal finance, and self-finance. Informal sources and self-finance
contribute Rs25.5 trillion to the sector, of which informal finance accounts for Rs24.4 trillion. In other words,
78% of the finance used by MSMEs is met by informal sources and self-finance. The remaining 22% (Rs6.9
trillion) is provided by banks and NBFCs, of which banks provide the bulk (91.8%).”).
22
Anup Singh, Abhapy Pareek, & Raunak Kapoor, Expanding Access to Finance for Small Businesses
in India: A Critique of the Mor Committee’s Approach Why Are The Banks Not Financing Small Businesses?,
MICROSAVE CONSULTING: BLOG (May 2014), http://blog.microsave.net/expanding-access-to-finance-for-smallbusinesses-in-india-a-critique-of-the-mor-committees-approach-part-2-why-are-the-banks-not-financingsmall-businesses/.
23
Id.
17
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are conducted electronically.24 By adopting a web-only presence, these lenders
are able to cut costs that are incurred in traditional banking.25 For example, the
table below compares the operating costs of a leading U.S. P2P platform,
Lending Club. to a traditional bank, Zion Bank and demonstrates that the
Lending Club’s operating expenses are significantly lower than Zion Bank’s.26
Operating Expense Comparison – Lending Club vs. Traditional Bank
(All figures in USD)

Lending Club

Zions Bank

Net Loan Revenues

$211

$1818

Sales, Marketing and
Advertising

$87

$23

Total Op Ex

$243

$1714

Op Ex less Sales & Marketing

$155

$1691

(Op Ex – Sales & Mktg.)/
Net Loan

74 percent

93 percent

A fully digital platform, alongside rising smartphone ownership, means P2P
technology is an increasingly accessible financial option for the traditionally
unbanked.27 P2P platforms are especially useful in rural areas where it is
uneconomical for traditional banks to build branches when transactions are

24

Berger & Gleisner, supra note 4, at 39.
Id. at 41 (“Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure
conditions . . . significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional
intermediaries . . . .”).
26
Saurabh Sharma, P2P Lending and Big Data: Banking on the Non-Banks, CROWDFUNDBEAT,
https://crowdfundbeat.com/2015/03/27/p2p-lending-and-big-data-banking-on-the-non-banks/ (last visited Aug.
27, 2018).
27
Smitha Verma, Unbanked Population: How Alternative Financial Services Ecosystem has Become Big
Boon for India, Fin. Express (Oct. 22, 2017, 1:26 AM), http://www.financialexpress.com/economy/unbankedpopulation-how-alternative-financial-services-ecosystem-has-become-big-boon-for-india/901477/ (“For a
country with a large unbanked population, the alternative financial services ecosystem has come as a big boon.
Customers, who were mostly shown the door by traditional banks, now have an instant, hassle-free and
accessible solution at the tap of a key.”).
25

MINUPURICOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19

438

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

5/23/2019 10:25 AM

[Vol. 33

small.28 Rural Indians no longer have to travel miles to access a credit
interface.29
Second, by eliminating the banking intermediary, P2Ps can offer low rates
for borrowers, high returns for lenders, and increase overall credit access.30
Platforms use a reverse auction model, in which lenders bid for a borrower’s
loan proposal, and the borrower has the freedom to either accept or reject the
offer.31 Because loan making is so decentralized, borrowers and lenders can
unbundle any unnecessary or unwanted services otherwise required by
traditional intermediaries.32 Tailoring loans this way significantly lowers
associated overhead costs.33 Low lending costs make it profitable to disburse
much smaller loans.34 These smaller loans require less collateral capital and are
thus much more suited to the credit needs of small businesses and rural
individuals.35 In 2016, almost thirty-four percent of borrowers were
entrepreneurs who used P2Ps to secure enough cash to expand operations.36

28
BASU, supra note 16, at 11. (“On average, a rural bank branch in India serves almost three times the
number of people served by a non-rural branch . . . . The volume of deposits and credit in rural areas is also
much lower than in urban areas. Per capita deposits in rural areas stood at Rs2,150 (US$47) or around 10 percent
of national per capita GDP in 2001, compared to Rs33,780 (US$740) or around 160 percent of per capita GDP
in the same year for urban areas. Credit per person in rural areas stood at Rs900 (US$20) or around 4 percent of
national per capita GDP versus a figure of Rs20,600 (US$450) for urban areas, which is around 100 percent of
national per capita GDP. The number of credit accounts in rural areas relative to the total rural population
amounts to only 3.4 percent against a ratio nearly three times higher for urban areas.”).
29
Id. at 20 (“In general, frequency of visits to formal financial institutions is low, with the main reason
for infrequent visits being the high costs related to travel time/transport.”).
30
Rajat Gandhi, What the Future Holds for the P2P Lending Market in India and the World, PLUNGE
DAILY (June 16, 2017), https://mybigplunge.com/opinion/what-the-future-holds-for-the-p2p-lending-market-inindia-faircent/ (“P2P lending offers the advantage of fixed and higher returns not vulnerable to market
turbulence, and that’s where it is winning over traditional market-linked investment instruments.”).
31
Bill Snyder, Exploring Auction Models for Peer-to-Peer Lending, STAN. BUS. INSIGHTS (Apr. 1, 2011),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/exploring-auction-models-peer-peer-lending.
32
Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 460–
61 (2011).
33
ALISTAIR MILNE & PAUL PARBOTEEAH, THE BUSINESS MODELS AND ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER
LENDING 4 (May 2016) (“The focused nature of their activities ensures that the administrative and overhead
costs required for setting up a P2P platform are relatively low.”).
34
Id. (“Some individuals and small businesses that do not satisfy the more stringent criteria that banks
now place on granting loans can, through peer-to-peer lending services, find alternative lenders who are willing
to take on the risk of providing such loans or to offer them at lower rates of interest.”).
35
Id.; see also Aman Malik, RBI’s P2P Lending Norms: A Step Backward or Forward?, VCCIRCLE
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.vccircle.com/rbis-new-p2p-lending-norms-a-step-backward-or-forward/ (“P2P
lenders, most of whom operate online, typically help borrowers get loans without collateral . . . .”).
36
Bhuvaneswaran, supra note 14.
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37

Third, P2P platforms offer ways for populations who have limited
identification documents and credit histories to access loans. When assessing
whether to issue a loan to an individual, banks assess the creditworthiness of the
borrower.38 Depending on a risk-assessment of their credit history, a bank will
determine if an individual is eligible for a loan and the terms of the loan.39 The
more favorable the credit history of the individual, the better the terms of the
loan.40 However, credit data is hard to find for people who do not participate in
traditional banking structures.41 Underwriting is also a labor intensive and timeconsuming process that does not make financial sense for a small business

37
Anothony Zeoli, Peer to Peer Lending: Taking the Fear Out of “Shadow Banking”, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (May 27, 2015), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/05/68355-peer-to-peer-lending-taking-thefear-out-of-shadow-banking/.
38
Rajkamal Iyer et al., Screening in New Credit Markets: Can Individual Lenders Infer Borrower
Creditworthiness in Peer-to-Peer Lending?, AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper 1 (Mar. 2010), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1570115 (“Traditionally, banks have played the dominant role in allocating credit partly
because they are attributed to have the financial expertise to evaluate borrowers and effectively intermediate
capital . . . .”).
39
Id.
40
Bruce D. Smith, Taking Intermediation Seriously, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING, 1319, 1321–22
(2003).
41
Corinne Abrams, Are You a Credit Risk? Indian Banks Dig Deep in Your Phone to Find Out, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-you-a-credit-risk-indian-banks-dig-deep-in-yourphone-to-find-out-1511433007.
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looking for a small loan.42 While P2Ps engage in traditional underwriting, they
also use big data analytics to determine a borrower’s creditworthiness.43 By
analyzing social media activity, mobile phone usage, and whatever demographic
material the borrower provides, P2Ps can identify, score, and underwrite credit
for low- and middle-income consumers who lack a formal credit history.44
Nearly three-quarters of borrowers on Faircent, an Indian P2P Platform, have a
score of less than 700, below the threshold at which the banks determined
lending is too risky or uneconomical.45 Lending to people with poor credit
background can mean higher interest rates.46 But the only alternate options for
those historically unable to access traditional banks are informal money lending
arrangements, with no legal protections or supervision.47 Given limited options,
comparatively high-interest P2P loans are the best choice. Some scholarship
points toward data analytics, like that done by P2P, being a much more accurate
form of risk-management in comparison to traditional credit underwriting.48
Furthermore, even borrowers with risky credit ratings may be able to find
philanthropic lenders through P2P platforms.
Fourth, P2Ps open up investing opportunities to underserved populations by
allowing multiple lenders to finance loans. Unlike with traditional lending in
which a loan has a single lender—usually a bank—P2Ps allow loans to be
fulfilled by multiple lenders.49 Lenders also can manage risk easily by lending
small amounts to many borrowers.50 P2P loans are also better insulated than

42
Sharma, supra note 26 (“Small businesses, whose capital needs are usually underserved by banks who
opt to avoid engaging in the labor-intensive underwriting process when smaller numbers are involved, benefit
from the borrowing options offered through these platforms.”).
43
Id. (“For lenders on P2P platforms, private individuals can enjoy a much higher return than today’s
savings accounts or other low risk investments offer. Institutional lenders can have direct access to the previously
difficult to reach consumer finance asset class.”).
44
Id.
45
Nishant Sharma, P2P Lending: In Game of Loans, RBI Arms a New Player, QUINT (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.thequint.com/news/business/rbi-with-a-new-p2p-lending-system.
46
Id.
47
Vinnie Lauria, Here’s Everything You Should Know About Alternative Lending in Asia, FORBES (Mar.
13, 2017, 12:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/vinnielauria/2017/03/13/heres-everything-you-shouldknow-about-alternative-lending-in-asia/#39558600113e (“P2P interest rates may be higher than those of
traditional loans, but in India’s mostly cash economy, they are the only option for many. For people who have
been historically neglected by traditional banks, the popularity of P2P lending in India continues to rise.”).
48
Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 148,
148 (2016).
49
Vinay Mathews, P2P Lending: The Real Benefits and Ways to Mitigate Risk, YOURSTORY (Nov. 21,
2016), https://yourstory.com/2016/11/p2p-lending-risk-mitigatigation/ (“Investing small amounts across a large
number of diversified loans will likely keep default rate at a reasonable and consistent level, thereby increasing
returns.”).
50
Id.
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stocks from market downturns, leaving lenders better protected in recessions.51
In the case of one borrower defaulting, lenders are still relatively unaffected.
Unlike informal lending networks, there are legal recourses available if a
borrower does not repay a loan.52 This allows rural individuals to invest modest
amounts and have steady monthly incomes.
Finally, increased P2P use has the potential to bring more transparency and
clarity to the larger credit market. Traditional banks pool, divide, and sell
consumer credit loans to investors.53 This mixing and packaging makes
traditional loans complex enough to diffuse accountability in the case of
defaults.54 However, P2P borrowers know the particular lenders to which they
are liable, and all P2P lenders know which particular borrowers make their
payments. If P2P returns fall, lenders know immediately which loans defaulted
and can adjust accordingly, either by modifying their portfolio strategies or
leaving the marketplace altogether.
P2P platforms solve some of the most pressing credit access problems in
India, without requiring any substantial infrastructure development. However,
the P2P model does signal a need for regulation to address some serious
concerns about consumer and investor protection.
II. WHAT THE RBI ADDRESSES, WHAT IT MISUNDERSTANDS, AND WHAT IT
MISSES
While the P2P sector is still small in comparison to the overall Indian
financing sector, legislators, investors, and P2P platforms themselves have
called for some type of regulation.55 Legislators want to set best practices for the
sector, investors want regulatory clarity, and platforms want credibility.56 But
the unconventional nature of the P2P model puts them in a regulatory grey
space.57 Unlike banks, P2P platforms do not conduct any direct lending,
51
Id. (“In 2008–09, the stock market had crashed, losing more than 55 percent of its value but globally,
P2P loans didn’t stop and borrowers continued to pay lenders money.”).
52
Id. (“The platform should facilitate the signing of a legally-binding agreement as well as collection and
holding of borrowers’ post-dated cheques which can be used by the lender to initiate criminal proceedings in
case of default.”).
53
Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed To Prevent
the CDO Meltdown, and How To Fix It, U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1361–63 (2009).
54
Id.
55
Bhuvaneswaran, supra note 14.
56
Id.; PTI, ‘NBFC Status to P2P Puts Compliance Burden; Lending To Go Up’, MONEYCONTROL (Oct.
9, 2017), http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/nbfc-status-to-p2p-puts-compliance-burden-lending-togo-up-2407535.html.
57
Jitendra Soni & Kanad Bagchi, RBI Paper on Peer-to-Peer Lending: A Case of Unmindful

MINUPURICOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19

442

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

5/23/2019 10:25 AM

[Vol. 33

including accepting deposits.58 Instead, arrangement fees make up the bulk of a
P2P platform’s income.59 P2P platforms exist in a middle ground where they
simply facilitate lender-borrower connections, but do not engage in directly
providing any financial services.60
In order to regulate P2Ps, the Reserve Bank of India had to first decide how
to classify P2Ps. On October 4, 2017, the RBI issued a Master Directive that
brought P2Ps under its jurisdiction by classifying them as NBFC-P2Ps under
Section 451 of the RBI Act.61 This classification subjected P2Ps to a slew of
reporting, prudential, and governance requirements.62 These guidelines provided
some much-needed clarity—but they also misunderstood, and so misregulate, a
much-needed service. First, it is unclear whether classifying P2Ps as NBFCs is
legally justified. Second, the RBI’s prudential and governance regulations take
an archaic regulatory approach that can inhibit P2P growth. Third, the RBI
regulations leave key consumer protection and investing issues unaddressed.
A. Can P2Ps Be NBFCs?
Indian banking laws allow the RBI to regulate both “banks” and “nonbanks.”63 To perform lending and borrowing activities, banks have to receive
banking licenses from the RBI.64 Similarly, non-banks engaged in “financial
activity’” have to obtain certificates of registration from the RBI.65 To determine
whether a company is engaged in financial activity, the RBI applies the
“principal business” or “50-50 Test.”66 The assets and income stream of a
company are examined from their most current balance sheet.67 If a company’s
income from the financial services it performs is more than fifty percent of its
gross income, then the company will be classified as a “NBFC.”68
Contradictions, WIRE (May 23, 2017), https://thewire.in/37842/rbi-paper-on-peer-to-peer-lending-a-case-ofunmindful-contradictions.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.; Master Directions, supra note 13.
62
Master Directions, supra note 13.
63
Soni & Bagchi, supra note 57.
64
Master Directions, supra note 13.
65
Id.
66
Press Release, Res. Bank India, Amendment to NBFC Regulations - Certificate of Registration (CoR)
Issued Under Section 45-IA of the RBI Act, 1934 – Continuation of Business of NBFI - Submission of Statutory
Auditors Certificate - Clarification (Oct. 19, 2006), https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Notification/PDFs/73378.
pdf; see also Varun Sriram, RBI Directive on Treating P2P Lenders as NBFCs Needs Clarity, VCCIRCLE (Oct.
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In traditional lending—where an institution accepts deposits on their balance
sheet and in turn loans out capital—the 50-50 Test easily applies. Simply put,
under the 50-50 Test, a traditional lender is classified as an NBFC if the interest
collected from their loans is fifty percent of their gross income.69 But P2P
platforms do not lend out any of their own funds or accept deposits from lenders
or borrowers.70 Their primary source of income is from commissions or
arrangement fees that are basically service charges that lenders and borrowers
pay for using their platforms.71 Given that P2Ps do not issue loans—they simply
facilitate them, and so cannot collect interest on those loans—it is unclear how
to apply the 50-50 Test to P2Ps.
While it is too early for any legal challenges to have taken place, Indian
courts could conclude that the 50-50 Test does not apply to P2Ps. Given the lack
of clarity as to whether P2Ps can be classified as NBFCs, it can be argued that
the RBI is overstepping and trying to regulate a tech company—which simply
happens to be in the financial sector—as an NBFC. Such a ruling would place
P2Ps outside the regulatory jurisdiction of the RBI, as the RBI can only regulate
companies that predominantly engage in banking or financial activity.72 P2P
leaders are already pushing to be classified as separate, primarily technological
entities, rather than as NBFCs.73
However, the RBI can circumvent the 50-50 Test if it consults with the
government and invoke special powers to classify an entity as an NBFC.74 It
seems the RBI might have waived the 50-50 Test for P2Ps. The RBI did this in
the past with mortgage guarantee companies and account aggregators.75 In both
these cases, however, the companies were exempted from the NBFC prudential
and governance requirements to which P2Ps are subject.76
If the goal of the RBI is to provide structure and clarity to the P2P sector, it
must either explain how the 50-50 Test applies to P2Ps or provide justification
69

Id.
Soni & Bagchi, supra note 57.
71
Id.
72
Sriram, supra note 68.
73
PTI, supra note 56 (“‘Putting P2P lending companies under the broad umbrella of NBFC regulations,
however, is going to lead to several major problems,’ said LoanAdda Co-Founder & CEO, Anshuman Mishra.
He said the sector will much rather be recognized for the technology they use to underwrite and will prefer to be
governed as a separate entity rather than being broadly classified as NBFCs.”).
74
Res. Bank India, Non-Banking Finance Companies in India’s Financial Landscape, RBI BULL. 91, 94–
97 (Oct. 10, 2017), https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Bulletin/PDFs/01AR101017F2969F6115EB4B5992BD
73976F9A905D.pdf.
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PTI, supra note 58; Master Directions, supra note 13.
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for why NBFC requirements apply to entities outside the RBI’s traditional
regulatory sphere.
B. Archaic Prudential and Governance Requirements
Under the RBI directive, P2Ps as NBFCs are subject to pre-existing
prudential and governance regulations, the same regulations that apply to
traditional lenders.77 There are three primary prudential norms:
1. All P2PS must have net-owned funds of more than Rs. 2 crore
(approx. $31,000 USD).78
2. P2Ps must maintain a leverage ratio of two (i.e., outside liabilities
of a platform must not exceed two times its owned funds).79
3. The maximum that a single lender can lend and the maximum that
a single borrower can borrow across all P2P platforms is Rs. 10
lakhs, (approx. $10,500 USD). The maximum that a single lender
can lend to a single borrower across all P2P platforms is Rs. 50,000
(approx. $770 USD).80
These capital requirements, leverage ratios, and caps are absolutely
necessary in traditional banking. Banks lend long-term loans against short-term
deposits. Thus, unexpected deposit withdrawals or surges in loan defaults can
bring banks to the edge of insolvency.81 Regulations imposing stringent capital
and leverage ratio requirements insulate banks from liquidity concerns and
balance sheet mismatches.82 Simply, traditional banking and lending is a capitalheavy operation; therefore, regulators must ensure that there is always enough
capital on hand to absorb losses.83
However, P2P lending is not a capital-heavy lending model. Operating costs
are currently minimal. For most P2Ps, technology (e.g., online platform set-up
and upkeep) and human capital (e.g., salaries and other remunerations) are the
only major expenditures.84 There are neither property rental nor maintenance
77
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Id.
83
Id.
84
MILNE & PARBOTEEAH, supra note 37.
78

MINUPURICOMMENTPROOFS_5.23.19

2019]

5/23/2019 10:25 AM

RUSHING TO REGULATE

445

costs for physical locations. Moreover, scaling-up does not require new
branches, and administrative costs are minimal.85 The question is: why require
P2Ps to have and maintain a minimum Rs. 2 crore of net-owned funds? The RBI
justifies the requirement by arguing that mandating a minimal capital
requirement ensures that only serious companies can participate.86 However,
currently, there are only thirty registered P2Ps in India, and P2P lending takes
up a tiny fraction of the larger consumer credit sector.87 An oversaturation of the
P2P market by small-time companies should not be a primary concern. Rather,
the focus should be on developing regulations that promote growth. The Rs. 2
crore requirement has already proven prohibitive to some P2P platforms. Sunil
Kumar, the founder of the P2P LoanMeet, said the amount was too large and
would hurt most P2P lending marketplaces. He noted, “[w]e need some time, at
least a year, to raise that kind of money.”88 However, existing P2P companies
only have a three-month window to meet all of the new RBI requirements.89
Given that P2P platforms are capitalized at tens of lakhs with modest debt-equity
ratios, a proportional capital base dependent on the size of a P2P portfolio is
more prudent.90 Having a Rs. 2 crore minimum might force cash-strapped, but
otherwise well performing, P2P platforms out of business.
Mandating a leverage ratio is also similarly inappropriate for the P2P lending
model and slows P2P growth. In traditional lending, leverage ratios are a way to
ensure that a company will be able to honor its financial obligations. Companies
can only lend, or carry debts in their books, in proportion to the amount of capital
on hand.91 But once again, P2Ps do not carry any debt and they do not directly
lend. As VSSB Shankar, the founder of i-lend, noted: “The question of leverage
ratio doesn’t arise when you’re not lending on your balance sheet.”92 The RBI
argues that a prescribed leverage ratio ensures that “platforms do not expand

85
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with indiscriminate leverage.”93 But in the P2P model, lending on the platform
is not tied into how much debt the P2P company has. The platform is not the
lender; the lender is an independent third party that is not bound by the leverage
ratio. Mandating a leverage ratio offers no protection or value to the P2P model.
Capping amounts borrowers and lenders can transact again misses the mark
and substantially burdens P2Ps. While P2P platforms facilitate, on average,
smaller loans than traditional lenders, setting such a low cap for borrowers and
lenders cuts off the possibility of P2P platforms drawing in high net-worth
individuals.94 For three out of the four leading Indian P2P platforms, this cap
would affect their minimum loan amounts.95

Company

Location/
Year

Min.
Loan

Max
Loan

Lendbox

Delhi,
2015

Faircent

Gurgaon,
2014

Lenden Club

Mumbai,
2015

Rs.
10,00
0
Rs
30,00
0
Rs.
25,00
0

Rs.
5,00,
000
Rs.
5,00,
000
Rs.
3,00,
000

i-lend

Hyderabad,
2013

Rs.
25,00
0

Rs.
3,00,
000

Average
Rates

Borrower
Evaluation
Criteria

15–20%

More than 120
variable sing Big
Dat Intelligence
CIBIL score,
salary, bank
account data
Third part credit
score, salary and
other parameters

16–21%

Social behaviour
through social
network data

As high as
36%
22–23%

Sanjay Darbha, founder of Peerlend, noted, “Such low limits will push
people to cash borrowings from expensive money lenders and defeat the entire
purpose around P2P lending.”96 The cap significantly restricts P2P growth, as
now P2Ps can only grow by bringing many more borrowers and lenders into the
platform.

93
94
95
96
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RBI regulations also prohibit P2Ps from participating in lending activities or
in financial transactions apart from being simple intermediaries.97 Given their
now limited revenue streams, P2Ps might not be able to bear the additional costs
of complying with RBI requirements. There will also be significant restructuring
costs for many P2Ps. For example, considering the fact that NBFCs are to be
regarded as companies, P2P firms that are currently registered as LLPs or
partnerships will be required to restructure.98 The RBI regulations have
considerably increased entry barriers while restricting P2P platforms’ abilities
to explore options for mitigating increased costs.
C. What P2P Platforms and Consumers are Still Waiting for
By trying to control P2Ps through traditional—and often inapplicable—
capital regulations, the RBI has overlooked two key P2P areas that require much
clarification. The RBI has failed to address P2P remittance transactions and data
security for P2P users.
D. P2Ps and Remittances
India is the largest remittance recipient in the world.99 The majority of Indian
remittances are small in amount, with transactions under Rs. 20,000 (approx.
$300 USD) making up forty-three percent of remittances in 2010.100 A large
proportion of remittances are sent by migrant laborers to families in rural
areas.101 Given the low incomes of remitters, and the small amounts involved,
remittance transfers can be quite costly.102 The smaller the remittance size, the
higher the transaction cost percentage for formal banking to be the cheapest
option the remittance must be around Rs. 94,000 (approx. $1500 USD).103 Most
97
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2017),
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remittances.”).
100
Res. Bank India, Remittances from Overseas Indians: Modes of Transfer, Transaction Cost and Time
Taken, RBI BULL. 114 (Dec. 2013).
101
Id. (“Workers’ remittances have remained an important source of external finance for India since last
three decades. These flows have not only been a dominant component of India’s invisibles, their trend has also
been stable over the years as in the case of many other developing countries.”).
102
Vishwanathan, supra note 99. (“[R]emittances are expensive for small companies. Banks charge on an
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exchange rate.”).
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rural remittances are not large enough to make formal banking an affordable
option.
Even if someone in a rural area wants to make a small remittance through
formal channels, villages rarely have banks or agents.104 A study from the Centre
for Micro Finance in India shows that making a transfer through a bank requires
an average of fifteen minutes of travel and forty-five minutes of wait time for
senders, then another forty minutes of travel and fifty minutes of wait time for
recipients.105 An average transfer would take two and a half hours.106 In
comparison, transferring remittances through informal channels takes on
average twenty-eight minutes total.107 Cost and access barriers force an
estimated seventy percent of total domestic remittances to go through informal
channels.108

2011), http://www.cgap.org/blog/how-do-migrant-workers-move-money-india.
104
Nikhil Joseph & Benjamin D. Mazzotta, Frugal Finance: How Eko Helps India’s Migrants Move and
Manage Money (Inst. Bus. Glob. Context, Working Paper No. 14-01, 2016).
105
Oliver & Radcliffe, supra note 103.
106
Id.
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Id.
108
TNN, ‘Payments Banks to Reduce Rural Remittance Costs’, TIMES OF INDIA (Oct. 24, 2015),
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Payments-banks-to-reduce-rural-remittancecosts/articleshow/49512996.cms.
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However, while informal channels are easier to access and cheaper for many
Indians, they also exist outside formal regulations.109 P2P platforms significantly
cut transaction costs for small remittances, while offering regulatory
protections.110 P2Ps cut remittance costs by matching outgoing and incoming
remittances. For example, if an individual in any other country wants to transfer
money to another individual in India, the individual would then give the money
to a P2P office in the transferor’s country. The P2P platform then scouts for a
person in India transferring the same amount of money to the transferor’s
country. Next, the P2P platform matches these two transactions to transfer
money within the borders of the respective countries. By ensuring that no money
actually leaves a country, P2Ps eliminate extra costs.
However, the Indian rupee is not freely convertible.111 To buy, sell, or covert
the rupee, an individual needs explicit legal authorization.112 These regulations
set the price of the rupee by limiting the yearly volume that can be converted
and the entities that can transact rupees.113 The new RBI regulations
unambiguously state that the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), and
its rupee conversion restrictions, apply to all P2P platforms.114 As a result, P2P

109

Joseph & Mazzotta, supra note 104.
Vishwanathan, supra note 99.
111
Arjun Sinha & Aymen Mohammed, Regulatory Challenges to Fintech in India, YOURSTORY (Feb.
17, 2016), https://yourstory.com/2016/02/fintech-india-regulatory-challenges.
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platforms under FEMA Sections 3(a) and (b) explicitly prohibit any payment “to
or for the credit of any person resident outside India in any manner.”115
More so, any transaction in which the sender and receiver are not both Indian
residents qualifies as a cross-border transaction; this triggers even more
restrictions under Indian law.116 The RBI regulations explicitly prohibit P2Ps
from engaging in any cross-border activities.117 The only way for a P2P to work
around these restrictions is to submit an application to the Indian Banks
Association asking to conduct inbound international transactions.118 Outbound
international transactions require separate applications.119 Then, the Indian
Banks Association can make a recommendation to the RBI, and the RBI has the
final say regarding whether an organization can conduct a cross-border
transaction.120 As Dilip Ratha—the manager of migration and remittances at the
World Bank—notes, “[t]he technology to provide remittance service for cheap
is already there. Because of regulations, new players with efficient technology
are not able to get into the market.”121
Companies that want to capitalize on the informal remittance market look to
work around RBI restrictions by adopting a Unified Payment Interface (UPI)
approach.122 The UPI method assigns each user a ”unique virtual address” on a
smartphone.123 Users can then transfer money from one address to another. The
catch is that each user must have an existing bank account.124 Unlike P2P
transfers that use virtual wallets and do not require a bank account, the UPI
method is essentially a cross-bank transfer. Because many rural Indians face
considerable barriers to bank access, forcing P2P platforms to adopt a UPI
method results in the exclusion of rural Indians from formal banking and its
protections. The RBI’s guidelines overregulate a key potential use of P2P
platforms for rural Indians.

115
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E. P2P Data Security Concerns
While the RBI’s approach to P2Ps over-regulate, and also severely underregulate, setting data and cyber security standards for P2P platforms. The RBI
regulations require all P2Ps to follow stringent Know Your Customer (KYC)
guidelines.125 KYC norms require that all P2Ps store and verify documents to
establish the names and addresses of all customers.126 Indian banks have always
been subject to KYC norms; however, banks only have to comply with KYC
norms when a transaction exceeds a certain amount.127 However, in an effort to
battle money laundering, the RBI now requires P2P to fully comply with all
KYC norms in transactions as low as Rs. 10,000 (approx. $157 USD).128
Previously, digital transfers were subject to only minimum KYC norms and
required only a phone number verification.129 However, now the RBI requires
full KYC norms, which can be “tedious, complicated[,] and expensive” for many
users.130
While financial transactions must be secure, the RBI fails to understand that
the ease of P2P use drew previously unbanked individuals closer towards formal
financial institutions. Current regulations require P2Ps to ensure that lenders
knows details about the borrowers’ personal identities.131 However, before the
new regulations, both borrowers and lenders could rely on the P2P platform to
use data from social media accounts or past informal credit history to create a
reliable picture of all parties involved in a transaction.132 Now, the RBI’s KYC
norms place the burden on clients to prove their identities and addresses through
a cumbersome point-based list of Officially Valid Documents (OVD).133 There
is no option to substitute social medial posts, or anything not enumerated in the
guidelines, for an OVD.134 Given that a large swath of new P2P users were

125
Priyanka Pani, RBI Guidelines on Full-KYC ‘Can Kill Wallets’, HINDU BUS. LINE (Oct. 12, 2017),
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/money-and-banking/rbi-guidelines-on-fullkyc-can-kill-wallets/
article9901830.ece.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. (“‘They (RBI) are asking full KYC for transactions as low as ₹10,000. This will kill the industry
and maybe take us back to the traditional mode of money transfers i.e. through banks,’ said a source, who is a
part of an industry body for wallets.”).
129
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traditionally unbanked, it is likely that the P2P users will not have easy access
to OVDs. The more complex the KYC system, the greater the risk that someone
will choose to circumvent a formal credit system for an unregulated alternative.
Even if clients do manage to produce OVDs, the “KYC process [remains]
tedious, complicated and expensive” for P2P platforms.135 For example, if a
client manages to produce a passport, the P2P platform must verify that the
passport belongs to the client, is valid, and does not register on any blacklists.
To cut down on KYC costs, P2P platforms require clients to come to their
offices, go to a partner officer for verification, or use a courier service to
complete the KYC process.136 Traveling to an office may provide prohibitive for
rural Indians; it may also defeat the purpose of having a digital banking service
whenever and wherever you need it. Jitendra Gupta, the managing director of a
P2P platform, notes that the KYC norms “destroy the idea of a wallet as an
intermediate option for customers; they might as well open a bank account
now.”137 Requiring a client to use a partner or courier service for verification
might also prove prohibitive for P2P platforms. The cost of verification for each
client ranges between fifteen and thirty USD. 138 Although most P2P transactions
are small, the verification costs still can make previously viable transactions
unprofitable. Established banks may be able to absorb these costs; however,
smaller P2P platforms may be unable to do so.139 Sriram Jagannathan, the vice
president of payments at Amazon India, issued a statement on behalf of many
P2P platforms, urging the RBI “to re-examine this in line with international
guidelines, and adopt a framework of proportional KYC.”140
Of more concern is full compliance with KYC guidelines that entail massive
collection of personal data. The RBI’s regulations are silent on how this data
should be stored and protected.141 The Kaspersky Cybersecurity Index contends
that “India is one of the most vulnerable countries to attacks by banking
135
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malware.”142 The Indian Secretary at the Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology noted, “‘Mobile is a dangerous device with the kind of
data it is leaking.’”143 And recently, a data security breach in India potentially
exposed the entire population’s personal data.144 Subsequently, in November
2017, more than 200 government websites inadvertently published the banking
details of thousands of citizens.145 The Indian government understands the
precarious state of Indian cyber security—two working groups from the RBI and
the Department of Telecom will establish guidelines on cyber security standards
for mobile applications and devices.146
However, there is no set date for when these guidelines will be released—
the working groups hope to release the guidelines soon.147 While data security
timelines are vague, the RBI has set very clear deadlines by which P2Ps must
comply with all KYC norms.148 All existing P2P platforms were given until
December 31, 2017 to fully comply with KYC norms.149 Unable to meet this
deadline, many platforms have asked for extensions. The RBI is currently
considering these applications.150 If the RBI, without addressing data security
concerns, continues to rush forward with KYC compliance, it threatens the
future of a crucial industry.
All Indian P2P stakeholders recognize the need for regulation. However, the
RBI regulations, even if only an initial step in a larger regulatory regime, stand
to hinder P2P access and growth. The current scheme overregulates areas critical
to P2P growth while simultaneously leaving other crucial areas completely
unregulated. Moving forward, the RBI needs to significantly restructure their
approach to P2P lending if it is to be kept attractive and accessible. The U.S.

142
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P2P platform exemption regime offers an alternative framework for P2P
regulation in India.
III. WHAT IS NEXT FOR INDIAN P2PS? LESSONS FROM THE U.S. P2P MODEL
The current Indian P2P industry closely resembles its early U.S. counterpart.
Much like in India, early U.S. P2P platforms were largely self-regulated.151
These P2Ps initially comprised a small fraction of U.S. financial markets.152
However, as in India, the rapid growth of these unregulated platforms caught the
eye of government regulators.153 In 2008, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) intervened and required that platforms register their loans as
securities under the Securities Act of 1933.154 These registration requirements
were met with the same critiques seen in India. The costs and logistics of
registration force platforms to exit the market and deter new players from
entering.155 The founder of a leading U.S. P2P platform, Prosper, commented,
“there should be ten companies up here today. Unfortunately, we’re the only two
companies [Prosper and Lending Club] that had the capital and the resources to
survive the securities’ regulatory process.”156
In response to the impact of SEC registration requirements on the P2P
industry, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report
discussing options for regulating P2P platforms going forward.157 The 2011
report noted that the SEC system of regulation “lacked flexibility and imposed
inefficient burdens on firms.”158 The GAO report offered an alternative approach
wherein the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) would regulate P2P
platforms.159 Under the CFPB, P2Ps would be exempt from federal securities
151
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laws and the associated prohibitive registration costs.160 Proponents of this
approach argue that CFPB can create tailored registration procedures that are
better suited for P2P management and growth.161 However, critics of the CFPB
approach argue that moving away from SEC regulation is a drastic step that
excludes financial experts from regulating a volatile industry.162
U.S. regulators needed to find a way to encourage growth in a burgeoning
industry, while managing the unique risks P2P growth poses. Rather than
continuing with rigid SEC regulations—or opting for a radical new CFPB
framework—U.S. regulators carved out a new classification for P2Ps within the
SEC’s purview. In 2012, Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
(JOBS Act) contained provisions for a new class of P2P platforms
called ”emerging growth companies.”163 As long as their annual revenue is
below $1 billion USD, and they fall under certain lending thresholds, P2P
platforms are exempt from SEC registration requirements.164 Even if they must
comply with SEC registration, the JOBS Act exemption gives P2P platforms the
option of submitting an initial registration statement to the SEC to address any
initial comments before a public filing.165 The exemption also allows for tailored
limits on capital requirements, individual investment limits, and eligibility
guidelines.166 The emerging growth companies category relaxes some of the
prohibitive costs and logistics associated with SEC registration, while allowing
for government regulation of a still largely unpredictable industry.
The relatively conservative exemption approach of the U.S. is what the
Indian P2P industry needs. Just as the SEC regulates the U.S. P2P industry, the
RBI oversees the Indian P2P industry.167 To completely eliminate RBI P2P
regulations, even with their imperfections, would be a radical shock to an
160
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industry that has already scrambled to meet one set of regulations.168 However,
in a further parallel to early U.S. P2P platforms, Indian P2Ps are struggling under
rigid and sometimes misinformed regulations.169 Carving out a P2P specific
category in existing NBFC regulations allows the RBI to tailor regulations to
meet the needs of Indian P2Ps without resorting to a drastic regulatory overhaul.
Rather than fully revising primary prudential norms, such as minimum capital
requirements and leverage ratios, the RBI can create an opt-out regime for P2Ps
that would be overly burdened. Such an approach leaves the larger NBFC arena
undisturbed while nurturing a fledgling industry. More so, following the U.S.
approach allows the RBI to focus on filling in regulatory gaps. Rather than
pursuing a fundamental regulatory restructuring, the RBI can look towards
promulgating data security and cross border transaction rules. Finally, nothing
in this regulatory approach precludes a later revision of the Indian P2P
landscape. Adopting an exemption approach gives both the RBI and the Indian
P2P industry time to understand what the P2P landscape needs to grow.
CONCLUSION
Encouraging P2P growth is crucial to meeting the banking needs of many
Indians. However, earlier unchecked P2P growth has shown that without
regulation, the P2P industry falters. Regulation is necessary to mitigate risks and
instill confidence in an unfamiliar business model.
Unfortunately, the RBI framework overregulates an industry it needs to
nurture. RBI prudential and governance norms have increased entry costs and
overly burdened existing P2Ps. The capital requirements, leverage ratios, and
lending caps mandated by the RBI pose a significant threat to the P2P industry.
Similarly, the areas the RBI leaves unregulated—remittances and data
security—also jeopardize current P2P operations and future lending. In an
attempt to legitimize P2P lending, the RBI has fundamentally misunderstood
how P2P lending actually works.
P2P platforms are a unique combination of new financial technology and
traditional banking services. Rather than pigeonholing P2Ps into existing, but
insufficient, legal categories, the RBI needs to reassess how it regulates P2Ps.
However, the RBI should not focus its energy on a total regulatory overhaul.
The Indian P2P industry is still scrambling to adjust to current RBI regulations,
the effects of which are still not completely understood. The U.S. exemption
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approach would allow the RBI to tailor regulations while still benefiting from
the resources and stability of an existing regulatory framework. This approach
would meet current P2P needs and operate with enough flexibility to allow for
future P2P growth. The RBI needs to reform regulations to ensure that it does
not stifle an industry that stands to solve India’s pressing credit access problems.
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